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Perhaps I’d be better off coining a different term here, perhaps Googlocracy or something like that. I just looked up Googlism and of course it’s a whole website dedicated to using the search engine to create a series of declarative statements about anything you’d care to run through its filter. But that’s not what I mean by it. Rather than an online word game, I use the term Googlism to refer to an emerging capitalist ideology. I used it a few days ago to quickly summarize Unger’s advocacy of a highly change-oriented, deeply democratic, market-friendly society that seeks to perpetuate a flux of creativity and innovation in all spheres of life. A system that expands the logic of labor flexibility and individual free agency while decentralizing global capital through democratic transformations of business, and reinventing the purpose and practices of governments at all levels.
I just finished reading Pulse: The Coming Age of Systems and Machines Inspired by Living Things by Robert Frenay. This book is fundamentally an updated version of Alvin Toffler’s Future Shock, which in the early 1970s glibly predicted a whole range of profound changes, but attributed to the people experiencing the general speedup taking hold at the time a state of shock. The implication was that there was an unstoppable march of progress and that it had accelerated to the point that people were no longer capable of comprehending the society that was emerging, but it was taken for granted that the changes were a positive manifestation of a basically benevolent evolution of society.
Frenay is not as glib, nor as oblivious to social consequences, as his futurologist predecessors. But he is as naïve about capitalism, cloaking himself in a supposed 21st century realism that has cast aside the “ideological hostility toward all business [as] a vestige of twentieth-century thinking, the product of an old feud no longer relevant.” I had a good time reading his book, which is well crafted and covers a huge range of material that I’m quite interested in. His basic argument is that we’re at the historic beginning of a cultural supercession of “machine age thinking,” a mindset that is going to be replaced by the New Biology. He is committed to the logic of free markets, business, and the kind of so-called “natural capitalism” that Paul Hawken, Amory Lovins and the Santa Fe Institute are so fond of invoking.
To be sure, a rigorous calculus imposed by natural systems, in terms of resource depletion, waste, long-term sustainability, etc. is a reform that world capitalism desperately needs. But Frenay is too enamored of his tidy naturalistic analogies (structure and process, figure and ground, individual and communal, bottom-up and top-down, linear and lateral, competition and cooperation, chaos and order, adaptable and stable, local and global) to see any inherent conflict between capital and labor as key to the problem. Instead, he spends a good chunk of his final chapter blaming the legal fiction of “corporate personhood” for the breakdown in feedback loops that, if restored, would lead back to a “sweet spot” between free enterprise and collective well-being.
It’s quite a challenge to get a handle on this moment in history. Frenay’s book reinforces that feeling with its sweeping overview of rapid changes in biology, nanotechnology, computer networks and artificial intelligence, and much more. But he is not an unabashed booster of technological revolution. Instead he sees an emerging logic that offers a path out of the widely acknowledged dead-end of ecological collapse that we’re rushing towards. But, unlike some of us radicals, he sees no problem with the logic of business or the deeper flaw of a society based on buying and selling human time (wage-labor). In this way he fits alongside Roberto Unger‘s acceptance of these basic capitalist relationships. Frenay comes out of a long tradition of American technological determinism, or at least technofix-ism, in which problems will be solved because brilliant people are thinking up ingenious solutions that will just naturally promulgate themselves because they’re so darn smart. What makes his take more sophisticated than your run-of-the-mill techno-booster is that he has understood something of the science he’s writing about. One of the crucial breakthroughs of the New Biology is that it overcomes linearity and isolated analysis that mechanistic industrialism used so successfully to make such a mess. Instead, the new paradigm understands that everything is connected, that all systems are open and fluid and in a state of constant exchange and interactivity with each other, and that for the tension between chaos and order to produce increasingly complex adaptive systems that can survive, they crucially depend on adequate feedback loops.
“Assuming we get through the problems we face today, time will show the machine age as little more than a halting first step. With a near horizon populated by genetic engineering, nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, increasingly life-like robots, and the many other ways computers are linking our imaginations to biology, we now face what may be the single most important fact in our brief and turbulent history: through us, evolution is accelerating”¦ Can we blow it?”¦ of course we can”¦ As we put the evolutionary pedal to the metal, the chance for catastrophic failure parallels that of epic promise.”Given our limited intellect, limited senses, and limited understanding, how can we hope to steer this rough new beast toward Bethlehem? The answer lies in feedback culture. We’re going to need diversity, to generate the beneficial tensions that make a living system smart and dynamic. And we’ll need clear and undistorted feedbacks to realistically monitor where we stand” to tell us we’ve overtipped the balance too far towards chaos or too far towards order, too far toward competition or too far toward cooperation” before a downward trend takes hold.”
This call for clear and undistorted feedbacks sounds pretty good. But Frenay is not stupid and he identifies the absence of a free, unfettered, un-sponsored media with the absence of accurate feedback, along with the widespread externalization of costs by capitalist businesses, a process that continues and expands daily. How might mechanisms of proper feedback be integrated into the world economy, or even just a local economy? Frenay ponders various schemes for the money form that have come and gone in the past, endorsing a concept that causes money to steadily lose value parallel to the 2nd law of Thermodynamics in which energy constantly dissipates. But such eccentric proposals will never gain the political power to unseat the current system. And that’s where Frenay, and all the do-gooder natural capitalists always fail: the utter lack of realism to imagine that the world as we know it can be transformed by good ideas and gentlemanly argument. Such ideas and proposals should be promulgated, but to really alter the power relations in society will take something much more profound, deep and wide social movements that can assert new kinds of power from below.
Historically radical change has emerged in depression and war, as old systems are abruptly toppled and replaced by new ones. As we ponder the breakdown of old political forms, we seek new ways to establish democratic power. We need new systems that would allow a democratic polity to grab power by the balls and transform it so thoroughly that the great work of technologists, biologists, philosophers and others can be put to use. Absent that kind of profound upheaval, whether motivated by a broad insistence on the possibilities of a pleasurable life for all, or by an ecological or economic collapse, books like Pulse are just wishful thinking.
In spite of my sense that this kind of work is hopelessly naïve, I find in it the elements of a new reformism that parallels the words of Roberto Unger. I have thought for a couple of decades that if we are in the midst of a deep crisis that produces war and/or depression (as it has repeatedly in the past two hundred years), that there is a “purpose” capitalistically that we might be able to anticipate. (Of course, as a long-time lefty, I always wish crisis would lead to revolution and a vaguely utopian future, but that, too, seems delusional.) In think that “˜purpose’ is to destroy the capital fixed in the petrochemical/oil/auto industries and pave the way for a new round of accumulation and global integration based on this so-called New Biology. The obvious political spokespeople of this “reasonable” movement to reinvent our society are the green philosophers and technologists who see nothing incompatible between markets and human well-being, provided that the markets have “real costs” and respond to biological reality. So Frenay is very enthusiastic about William McDonough and the designers and architects like him who are already working with the Chinese government and Ford Motor Co. and other globe-straddling entities to create the new technologies and practices for the next system.
One of the unsolved and largely un-addressed problems of this transformation is the need to come up with new ways to calibrate and measure economic well-being beyond GDP, a point that Frenay makes too. Quite recently the Chinese government announced that they were sending back to the drawing board an effort by their environmental ministry to measure the economic effects of various development schemes, but they are at least trying to come up with something, which is more than you can say about the Theocratic War Criminals we have running the U.S. these days.
I’m going to throw this quote from Roberto Unger in here at the end, to illustrate a vague convergence between Frenay’s New Biological thinking and Unger’s proposals for the Left (this overlapping green soft leftism is what I want to call “Googlism”). I think they overlap around the notions of feedback and revision, and of finding the sweet spot between individualism and collectivity, cooperation and competition, stability and chaos:
Unger: “We are greater than all the particular social and cultural worlds we build and inhabit; they are finite with respect to us, and we are infinite with respect to them. There is always more in us” in each of us individually as well as in all of us collectively” than there can ever be in them. No social order can provide a definitive home for the human spirit so understood. However, one order will be better than another if it diminishes the price of subjugation that we must pay to have access to one another. One order will be better than another if it multiplies opportunities for its own revision, thus attenuating the difference between acting within it, on its terms, and passing judgment on it from the outside, on our own terms. One order will be better than another if enables us to shift the focus of lives away from the repeatable to that which does not yet lend itself to repetition: to the perpetual creation of the new.” (pp. 168-169, What Should the Left Propose?)
Finding analytical insights that help illuminate this confusing time in history is difficult. Doing such analysis is hard, and giving an analysis that is more than just rhetorical flourish wrapped around ideological presuppositions would be to provide a “hard analysis.” I just finished reading such a hard analysis in Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System by Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly J. Silver. The book is divided into four big chapters, and was cowritten with eight others, and presents a fascinating long-term view of hegemonic succession in the modern world.
To grossly simplify the book’s argument, there have been two previous historic transformations like the one that is now underway. The first was when the Dutch lost their control of the emerging transnational economy to the British, and the second was when the British Empire gave way to the U.S. Having denoted those as the main transformations, the authors delve into the specific processes by which it happened, the way the structure of business evolved through these transitions, the role of crisis and war in accelerating the deeper trends already observably underway. Remarkably, during the latter stages of losing hegemony, both Dutch and British finance capital enjoyed periods of expansion and apparent success, which corresponds closely to the reflation of U.S. power and financial control globally since the 1980s, well after the peak of U.S. world hegemony. The spasmodic thrashing of the dying beast visible now in Iraq and Afghanistan (who knows where else the small-minded theocrats and their corporate sponsors will attack before finally losing power) may serve the function that WWI played in undercutting British power, and the mid-18th century wars in Europe and North America played in dismantling Dutch power. One other interesting parallel in the big systemic process of change between the previous transitions and today’s is that in each case a financial crisis hit in the emerging power zone prior to the final demise of the existing hegemon. So a financial crisis in 1772 in London led to the unraveling of Dutch financial power in the following decade. The 1929 Crash in the U.S. led to a depression that with WWII finally destroyed British global financial power and paved the way for the U.S. More recently the 1997 East Asian financial collapse presages the rise of China and the whole east Asian region as the next dominant economic and political power in the world and the coming collapse of U.S. economic power.
The authors do not overstate their case and make clear in a series of five hypothetical propositions at the end of the book how the parallels to prior historic junctures help shed light on the momentous changes underway now, but also show how some crucial things are different now. In their second proposition, they note that unlike any previous case, there is now an unprecedented bifurcation of military and financial capabilities, which they think reduces the likelihood of war between the system’s most powerful units, though the same bifurcation is not capable of preventing a long period of systemic chaos. I would argue that with the emergence of an offensive U.S. war to control oil there will indeed be a long war, but as long as China, Russia, India and Brazil stay out of it, it will only serve to drain the resources of the declining hegemon and set the stage for a new global regime to emerge in its eventual wreckage. Clearly China is poised to assert itself in the coming years, but it’s not at all clear that it can lead to a new world system that resolves the problems left by the U.S.’s chaotic and self-serving endgame of plunder and destruction. (The unconscious reliance on systemic crisis as a prime motivator for radical change is one of the key points attacked by Roberto Unger in his What Should the Left Propose that I reviewed a week ago. While his proposals don’t ultimately satisfy me, I do appreciate that he boldly puts them into the public discussion. He concludes about his own prescription: “The advancement of alternatives like these would amount to world revolution. It would not deliver world revolution in the form we have been accustomed by the prejudices of nineteenth- and twentieth-century thought to associate with the idea of revolution: sudden, violent, and total change. The transformation would be gradual, piecemeal, and generally peaceful”¦ The most important sign that we will have succeeded would be that we would have diminished the dependence of change on crisis.”)
Arrighi and Silver point to the great proliferation in the number and variety of transnational business organizations and communities as unique to this period, and note how such a proliferation itself has accelerated the general disempowerment of states. That in turn has also produced the general hollowing out of social movements that depend on state intervention and state guarantees as their source of power, e.g. trade unions, etc. The authors make a general reference to the coming period as one in which there will be a changing spatial and ethnic configuration of the world’s labor force, which will also involve a much greater feminization of the same. The coming social conflicts will thus not be like the ones that characterized the 20th century or earlier.
And that loops me back to the ongoing question of “immaterial labor” new social subjects, and the search to understand what shape revolt might take now. After the Cambridge conference I felt the category of “immaterial labor” was really problematic and I’ve only grown more skeptical since then. In Cambridge I picked up a badly photocopied Aufheben #14 “Questions on Immaterial Labour”. It’s a tedious read itself, since it spends so much time beating up Negri and Hardt and Empire. I understand that N/H were responsible for popularizing the idea of “˜immaterial labor’ more than any other writers, but the detailed critique of their work leaves me yawning. Here’s some of their best writing summarizing part of their critique, which soon after this turns on a discussion of the confusion of subjectivity and objectivity in N/H and their ultimate religiosity!
“Negri and Hardt’s “˜new’ category of “˜immaterial’ labour, however, does not seem to be better than [the old category of mental labour]. Like “˜mental labour’ we have seen that immaterial labour includes side by side the call center worker and the top designer too. Using the wrong category, Negri and Hardt give themselves a hard time in trying to convince us why this category correctly encircles the potentially subversive “˜new subject: why the migrant, although he does manual work, is immaterial, and why the top designer, who is included in the category, is a revolutionary subject.”The problem of bad categories can be solved either by looking for more apprpropriate categories” or by making the bad category elastic enough to patch up all its shortcomings”¦ Negri and Hardt define”¦ immaterial labour”¦ as any possible human activity” either manual or mental, either done inside or outside the workplace” that produces ideas, communication or affections, either as product or a by-product. With this definition, immaterial labour can include anything. Indeed, what human activity is not an expenditure of thoughts, affects or an act of communication after all? Even the production of nothing can be seen as production of something: needs and desires, which are indeed human forms of affects and communications.
“The convenient elasticity of the category”¦ allows N/H to sneak into and out of the “˜subject’ of immaterial labour”¦ groups according to the current rating of sympathy scored in the liberal-leftist world. Thus black “˜communities’, tribes in the Pacific, housewives, students, Indian farmers fighting against the genetic industry, protesters involved in the anti-capitalist movement, workers in flexible jobs, economic migrants, the radical student and the academic like Negri are all in”¦. when anything”¦ can be considered as “˜production,’ we have found the Holy Grail of the theorist, the magic key for the Theory of Everything capable of accommodating everything in the end explaining nothing.”
On the other hand, there’s a link in it to John Holloway’s critique of Negri, which I found really well-written and concise compared to Aufheben’s 20 pages. Holloway has a different angle too. He is a long-time participant in the discussions around “autonomist Marxism” and his book Change The World Without Taking Power is a vital contribution, a stimulating recasting of the original idea of commodity fetishism. But in this article that originally appeared in Historical Materialism, he rebuts Negri for seeking to establish autonomist critique as a positive project. For Holloway it is impossible to meaningfully construct a revolutionary politics on anything else but a loud screaming NO, a basic negation of how our lives are reduced and stunted by life under capitalism. Holloway sharply takes apart the positive ontological project of Negri, insisting as he does in his book that “the world is not, there is no being, there is only doing, a doing torn asunder in such a manner that the done takes on a life of its own and appears to be”¦” I recommend reading Holloway’s argument, but here’s a quote I really liked from the end of it:
“We hate capitalism and fight against it, but that does not make us into the embodiment of good fighting against evil. On the contrary, we hate it not just because we adopt the common condition of the multitude, but because it tears us apart, because it penetrates us, because it turns us against ourselves, because it maims us. Communism is not the struggle of the Pure Subject, but the struggle of the maimed and schizophrenic.”
It’s too easy to get lost in arcane philosophy, reading one set of theoretical critiques against another. Often I find it quite interesting to a point and then suddenly I’m aghast at now much time I’ve spent on it, rather than doing my own work, seeking to understand the world I can observe and participate in. Of course these theories are important contributors to a larger framework of understanding and it’s just as loony to push them away as somehow separate and irrelevant. But it’s only one thread of a dense fabric I’m weaving these days. I’m also grappling with issues of science history and shifting paradigms, which I think dovetail into discussions of class composition and exodus from this mad moment in history in important ways”¦ more on that to come.
Back in San Francisco, here’s my last travel entry on Capri. We spent Monday at Capri and were amazed at its beauty and (unlike anywhere else around here) its pedestrian-friendliness. Here’s the view from the dock as you disembark at Capri.

And here’s a map of the Bay of Naples so you can see where the island is, about 40 minutes south-southwest of the city.

We immediately set out to the northeast corner of the island where the Roman emperor Tiberius held court for 10 years from 26-36 AD in what was then a palace dominating the island and the entire empire. Now it’s another beautiful ruin. We had a picnic in the ruins again and enjoyed peering over the cliff that Tiberius used to throw his enemies.



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